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Introduction
This essay is a critical reflection on restitution, a commonly assessed 
legal financial obligation (LFO) to offenders in the justice system.  Much 
has been written about the overly punitive nature of fines and fees, which 
are excessive and, in some cases, not even related to the offense.  For 
the most part, however, restitution to victims has not been the focus of 
this research.
248 2020:247C J LR
Courts routinely impose restitution and other victim-related LFOs 
on offenders.1  In the juvenile justice context, a purpose of restitution2 
is to teach youth offenders to take responsibility, which, by extension, 
aids in the rehabilitation of those youths.3  However, the reality is that 
restitution is just one of many LFOs that cripples offenders and their 
families’ ability to pay and to complete their conditions of justice system 
involvement.  Offenders and their families do not experience restitution 
as separate from other LFOs, even if they can see its rationale as differ-
ent.  Furthermore, alternatives to restitution (e.g., community service or 
letters of apology) are fraught with problems that render them less mean-
ingful to offenders and victims alike.
To highlight the problems of restitution, I use ideas from restorative 
justice and insights from my ongoing research on youths with LFOs, their 
families, and victims of juvenile crime.4  Restorative justice envisions a 
radically different way of approaching youth crime compared to the tra-
ditional juvenile court.  To do that, it calls for a clearer articulation of 
the reasons behind the court’s actions, more frequent communication 
between all parties, meetings between victims and offenders in lieu of 
formal court hearings, and a more equal balance of all voices (victims, 
youth offenders, and the community) in the decisionmaking process. 
Those ideas shed light on four hidden or unspoken realities of restitution 
1. Alexes Harris et al, Monetary Sanctions in the Criminal Justice System: a review 
of law and policy in California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, 
North Carolina, Texas, and Washington, Arnold Ventures (2017) (finding that 
all nine states in their study on LFOs charged restitution and some had addi-
tional ‘victim-related’ LFOs to support general victim funds, victim assistance 
fees or brain/spinal injury funds).  In Dane County, WI, where I conducted inter-
views about LFOs in the juvenile justice system, the court charged $20 per case 
for the DA’s Victim Witness office, whether or not the youth’s case involved a di-
rect  victim.
2. Anne Schneider & Peter Schneider, Policy Expectations and Program Re-
alities in Juvenile Restitution in Victims, Offenders, and Alternative Sanc-
tions (Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway, eds. 1980) (identifying three types of resti-
tution that promote the rehabilitative ideal in the juvenile justice system: direct 
services to victims, financial payment to victims and community service.  This es-
say primarily focuses on the latter two, as they were most often mentioned in my 
interviews.)
3. Sarah Hoskins Haynes, et al., Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of Their 
Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13 Criminology and Pub. Pol’y 
31 (2014); Alex Piquero & Wesley Jennings, Research Note: Justice System-Im-
posed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in a Sample of 
Adolescent Offenders, 15 Youth Violence & Juvenile Just. 1 (2017).
4. The data for this essay are based on fifty-one interviews I conducted in 2018 with 
twenty families (twenty-one youths and twenty parents) and ten victims in Mad-
ison, WI about their experiences and views of LFOs in the juvenile justice sys-
tem; this research is part of a larger collaboration with the Juvenile Law Center 
funded by Arnold Ventures.  For more detail on this research and the methodol-
ogy, see Leslie Paik & Chiara Packard, Impact of Juvenile Justice Fines and Fees 
on Family Life: Case Study in Dane County, WI, Philadelphia, PA Juvenile 
Law Center (2019).
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that compromise its efficacy which this essay addresses: administration 
of alternatives to restitution, relational distance between victim and of-
fender, timing, and the offender’s sincerity in doing restitution.  While 
this piece focuses on restitution in the juvenile justice context, there is 
relevance for the criminal justice system in its use of restitution and re-
storative justice alternatives.
I. Key Tenets of Restorative Justice and Relevance for 
LFO Reform
The essay presents a brief review of restorative justice ideals to 
highlight the competing goals in actual restitution practices.  Simply 
put, restorative justice envisions an alternative to the traditional crim-
inal justice system in which both the offender and victim are repaired 
and restored by the intervention.5  Strang characterizes the difference 
between the two in the way that they deal with victims.6  The traditional 
criminal justice system seeks out punishment as a form of revenge for 
the victim, which may not necessarily consider the victim’s desires.7  In 
contrast, restorative justice seeks out “win-win” scenarios for the victims 
and offenders where they share their perspectives of what happened and 
learn to have empathy for each other through that process.  Instead of 
the more formalized adversarial process in the courtroom where victims’ 
desires previously were not considered, restorative justice focuses on 
equalizing power dynamics between parties, increasing transparency in 
the process, and considering all peoples’ voices, including the offender 
and the victim.  Crawford and Newburn identify three goals of restor-
ative justice: restoration, reintegration and responsibility.8  Restoration 
focuses on the victims by having the offenders address the harm caused 
by the crimes.  The other two, reintegration and repair, pertain more to 
the offenders by identifying ways to help them become more “pro-social” 
members of the community and learn to be more accountable for their 
actions in the future.
We can envision different types of restorative justice models based 
on those goals, which focus on three distinct groups: victims, offenders, 
and communities.  As described by McCold’s restorative justice typol-
ogy, ‘fully restorative’ programs have features that address all those 
groups (e.g., peace circles, community conferencing, or family group 
5. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989); John Braithwaite, 
Restorative justice: Assessing optimistic and pessimistic accounts, 25 Crime and 
Just.: A Rev. of Res. 1 (1991).
6. Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and Restorative Justice (2002).
7. Id. at 193.  Strang does present a more historical account in England before the 
state formalized a justice system in which repair, not revenge, was the central 
goal.  She writes in those times, the goal was to have the offender make “amends 
to their victims, so as to restore order and peace as quickly as possible and to 
avoid vengeful blood feuds”
8. Adam Crawford & Tim Newburn, Youth Offending & Restorative Justice: 
Implementing Reform in Youth Justice (2003).
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conferencing).9  Those that accommodate two groups (e.g., victim- 
offender mediation) are “mostly restorative,” and the rest that deal 
with one group (e.g., victim services, community service, compensation 
schemes) are “partly restorative”.  In a slightly different vein, Braithwaite 
discusses three kinds of standards for evaluating restorative justice pro-
grams: constraining, maximizing, and emergent.10  Constraining standards 
ensure that one party does not exert more power over the others and 
that the restorative justice options do not exceed the current levels of 
state punishment.  Maximizing standards relate to the rehabilitative and 
transformative moments of these programs for the offenders, victims, and 
communities.  Finally, emergent standards include remorse over injus-
tice, apology, forgiveness of the person, censure of the act, and mercy.11 
Braithwaite makes an important distinction between three standards: the 
last one needs to arise organically out of successful interventions to be 
meaningful, while the first two can be built into the program design.
With this brief review, we begin to see why the practice of financial 
restitution and alternatives to that restitution based on restorative jus-
tice ideas were not fully satisfactory to victims or offenders in my study. 
In my interviews, victims reported that some harms (e.g., emotional dis-
tress) were not eligible for restitution, which only allowed for physical 
damages.  The court in my study also capped the amount of restitution at 
$1000; while the cap recognizes youths cannot work to pay off the same 
amounts as adults, it does not pacify some victims who are told to pursue 
any further damages in small claims court.  In addition, the court often 
ordered youths to write letters of apology to the victims, effectively neu-
tering any effect of this potentially “emergent” standard since the youths 
are compelled to do it, versus having it emanate from their own initia-
tive.  None of these situations match up with restorative justice principles, 
leaving the victims feeling like their needs were not completely met and 
the offenders feeling as if their voices were unimportant in the process of 
taking responsibility for their own actions.
II. Four Hidden or Unspoken Realities of Restitution
My research in Madison, Wisconsin found four hidden or unspo-
ken realities to restitution and its alternatives that need to be part of 
any discussion moving forward about LFO reform.  They relate to the 
practicalities in alternatives to restitution (e.g., community service), the 
relational distance between victims and offenders, the timing of restitu-
tion, and the perception of youth’s sincerity in doing restitution and its 
alternatives.  The families and victims’ experiences reveal how these real-
ities limit the efficacy of the restitution process.
9. See Paul McCold, Towards a Mid-Range Theory of Restorative Criminal Justice: 
A Reply to the Maximalist Model, 3 Crim. Just. Rev. 357 (2000).
10. John Braithwaite, Setting Standards for Restorative Justice, 42 British J. of Crim-
inology 563 (2002).
11. Id. at 570.
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A. Limited Viability of Community Service as an Alternative to 
Restitution
Using community service as an alternative way to “work off” res-
titution reveals three problems: muddled vision, confusing process, and 
exploitable labor.  Regarding muddled vision, it is hard to restore both 
the victim and offender if community service has conflicting purposes. 
In Dane County, parents, youths, and victims express competing views of 
community service: Is it to teach kids a lesson (e.g., how hard it is to earn 
money, deterrent effect of doing manual labor or unpleasant tasks, every 
action has a consequence)?  Is it to help develop their prosocial quali-
ties or confidence (e.g., mentoring others, learning a skill)?  Is it both? 
Consider how Sam, a thirty-eight-year-old Asian American victim of car 
theft,12 expresses her view of community service:
I feel like they need to do some kinda community service to kinda 
reevaluate what they did .  .  .   And that way they don’t do it again.  
Like if I do it, this is the actions that I will have to face .  .  .   Or if 
they do something maybe to appreciate . . . like a children’s hospi-
tal . . . they have like these playtime[s] with the kids . . .  Maybe that 
will make them think like, okay here I am like doing these foolish 
stuff when these kids . . . are in here like ill . . .  So I want something 
that’s a community service that—that’s meaningful . . . that is gonna 
teach them something  .  .  .  they can take that skills when they get 
older to do that.  So they know like . . . I got this . . . I don’t need to 
steal . . . to get that stuff . . .  Like I can work hard for it.
Sam articulates her desire for community service that is both ed-
ucationally and vocationally beneficial for youth offenders while also 
helping them learn to take responsibility.  However, the reality of commu-
nity service often does not live up to these goals.  Youths are not learning 
transferrable skills by doing community service, which often entails man-
ual labor such as mowing lawns, shoveling snow, or picking up dog feces. 
Most youths also did not express learning anything about accountability 
by doing community service; rather, they talked about it more as just 
another court condition they were told to complete.  That affects some 
youths’ willingness to do it.  For example, Kobe, a sixteen-year-old black 
youth arrested for being a passenger in a stolen car, said he would be 
more invested in community service if it was like “helping, like, old peo-
ple or children . . . I could help them at school or something . . .  Like, just 
[with old people] like, talking to them and feeding them if I had to.  Like, 
cleaning up after them or something.”  Kobe highlights a key restorative 
justice principle that calls for giving a voice to the offender in taking 
12. All names are pseudonyms.  I have included only selected demographic infor-
mation about the families for confidentiality purposes, as most of the youths’ 
cases are still open.  Due to the relatively small size of the Dane County juve-
nile court population, staff would be easily able to identify the families if I put 
all that information (e.g., parents and youths’ ages, race/ethnicity, youths’ offens-
es, past court involvement).
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accountability.  Fostering a sense of youth agency might increase their 
potential for rehabilitation and reintegration.
Secondly, participants do not see community service as a meaning-
ful alternative to restitution when the process is not transparent.  Both 
youths and victims expressed confusion about it after the court made the 
initial determination of the restitution amount.  James, a sixteen-year-
old black youth arrested for reckless endangerment, said the court never 
informed him about the number of community service hours he had left 
to complete.  He said that the lack of communication greatly affected 
his motivation to complete the community service: “Every time I asked 
them the amount, they still talking about the thousand [dollars in res-
titution that the court ordered] and . .  .   I’m like, how?  How?  I come 
here like every weekend.  In the evening, in the summer on weekdays, 
on Wednesdays, you know?  Like, how do I still got this much?  So I just 
stopped going.”  In addition, victims stated feeling unclear about resti-
tution.  While the District Attorney’s office initiated and kept in contact 
with victims about the process, the victims also found that the commu-
nication ebbed greatly over time, especially as youths began to do their 
restitution.  Christine, a white victim of assault by multiple teenagers, 
discussed being perplexed by the process.  While she only claimed $25 
in restitution for a MP3 player that was broken during the incident, the 
court ordered $500 in restitution without explaining why.  She then got 
a letter saying one youth only owed $7.98; she ultimately got a check for 
$8.33.  She says, “I had no idea what this check was that came . . . I almost 
felt like, should I even cash it?”
In theory, these two problems with community service could be ad-
dressed by policies that are clearer and implemented more efficiently. 
However, the third and final problem is more complicated to resolve: 
viewing community service as a new form of forced labor.  Recent re-
search discusses how state and local governments and nonprofits benefit 
from having free labor like community service.13  Zatz et al. call it “re-
source distraction,” finding that the courts in Los Angeles sentenced 
between 50,000–100,000 people per year to community service in lieu of 
jail or court-related debt; Herrera et al. found that, in 2013–2014, those 
sentences translated into 382,000 hours or 219 fulltime jobs.14  Even if 
community service is completed, there are still problems, in that there 
13. John Krinsky & Maud Simonet, Who Cleans the Park?  Public Work and Ur-
ban Governance in New York City (2017); Noah Zatz et al., Get To Work or Go 
To Jail: Workplace Rights Under Threat, UCLA Institute for Research on La-
bor and Employment, UCLA Labor Center, and A New Way of Life Reentry 
Project (2017); Lucero Herrera, et al., Work, Pay, or Go to Jail: Court-Ordered 
Community Service in Los Angeles, UCLA Labor Center and UCLA School 
of Law (2019).  I should note that these studies focused on adults and/or the use 
of community service as a court-mandated alternative to jail or court fees that 
are separate from restitution.  However, the underlying criticism of community 
service remains applicable for this essay’s focus on restitution.
14. Zatz, supra note 13, at 3; Herrera, supra note 13, at 23.
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are no benefits or worker safety mechanisms in place.  Herrera et al. out-
lines the repercussions in terms of limited or no labor protections (e.g., 
standards, worker safety, and feedback) for the people performing that 
community service and for the people in the paid labor pool displaced 
from those positions.15
B. Lack of Recognition of the Complexities to the Relationship 
Between Victim and Offender
In discussing restitution, we often conceptualize victims and of-
fenders as two distinct groups of people, strangers to one another until 
this random act of crime ties them together.  However, the reality is not 
so simple; victims could be related to the offenders, or they could be part 
of the same community, possibly interacting every day.  In Madison, the 
court does not charge parents who are victims of their youths’ offenses 
for the LFOs incurred by their youths’ case, but it does still charge resti-
tution to the youths.  Consider how Evan, a white male whose daughter 
was charged with assaulting him, states that the court ordered restitution 
even though he did not want it.  He says: “I wasn’t like seeking restitution 
by any means . . . I knew that there was probably going to be some sort 
of restitution, um, ordered by the judge.”  He then offers his own opinion 
about another type of restitution: direct service to the victim:
Do like service for the actual person they committed a crime 
against . . . if they could someway serve the individual directly . . . ob-
viously [I] don’t know how that’d look.  Honestly it would be up to the 
victim . . .  Say like uh, a kid, there was a property crime versus like a 
violent crime, they stole from in their house or something . . . would 
they be able to like come over and like mow their grass . .  . some-
thing like that.  Where it would be like a uh, kind of like a chore type 
thing in order to have some sort of restitution that way.
Evan’s words make sense for certain crimes (e.g., property versus vi-
olent) and for certain victims who are open to the idea.  At the same 
time, prioritizing the victim’s desires brings up the concern mentioned in 
the previous part about the limits to rehabilitation and reintegration of 
youths if they do not have agency in that process.
Moreover, Evan’s ideas only address a financially measurable 
“harm,” not the potential emotional damage to the victim.  Consider the 
words of Dorothy, a sixty-year old white woman, about the impact of the 
crime on her, which includes more than just the physical action; a couple 
youths stole her car from her garage which was open to the street:
15. Herrera, supra note 13, at 25.  In addition, Krinsky and Simonet’s study men-
tions the complexities in managing multiple groups of ‘volunteers,’ which in-
clude court-mandated community service workers, workfare and summer youth 
employment programs.  Even if the work crew was comprised of only court-man-
dated people, the park supervisors were never sure if the workers were there for 
nonviolent offenses or potentially had preexisting conflicts with one another. 
That made it potentially unsafe for the supervisors and all of the volunteers on 
that work crew.  Krinsky & Simonet, supra note 13.
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You violated my privacy  .  .  .   You came into my house  .  .  .    You 
know, if that’s part of the restitution, then maybe they would realize 
it’s not just  .  .  . about getting the money, it’s for the accountability 
part  .  .  .  like, “You know what?  You don’t even .  .  .  these are real 
people, too, with families, and struggles, and all this stuff  .  .  .   And 
then, you’re just thinking about yourself to steal a car, or to go on 
a joy ride.
Furthermore, if the victim and offender live in the same community, 
there is a possibility of fear of retaliation on both sides.  Sam, the victim 
mentioned in the previous part, reported feeling vulnerable after her car 
was stolen from outside her apartment building; her family placed furni-
ture in front of the front door as a barricade from potential intruders for 
months afterward.  She explains how that affected her family life, saying: 
“We had to close ourselves in and I had a four-year-old [that] had to deal 
with that . . . we had to show him not to be scared of the world but yet we 
were scared of the world so . . . it was, yeah.  It was really hard for that.” 
She did not appear in court due to the same fear; she explains: “I felt real-
ly uneasy and uncomfortable . . . if these kids were doing this, what if the 
parents retaliate if I decide to say something? . . .  So I never went.”  Her 
family then decided to move to another unit in the apartment complex a 
few months later.16  Both victims and offenders expressed similar feelings 
when asked about the possibility of participating in victim-offender me-
diation sessions if they were offered as an option instead of restitution.17 
Sally, a seventy-five-year old white victim of property damage, is hesi-
tant, not just for herself but also for her family and the youth offender; 
she explains:
I wouldn’t want to meet him . . . cause I don’t know that it would do 
any good . . . I don’t want to have to see him in the store or something 
and— . . . I wouldn’t want it to put him uncomfortable if he’s gettin’ 
over it . . .  And another reason I wouldn’t want them to definitely to 
know our name . . . my granddaughters are in the same high school 
with him . . . I wouldn’t want, you know they [granddaughters] have 
a different last name so they really might not know.
These concerns and fears could be addressed with a strong facilitator 
at a victim-offender mediation session, who helps manage the expec-
tations, language used, and dynamics between the parties.18  However, 
16. They were not the only victims to report moving out of their home after the in-
cident; Peter, a victim of car damage, also moved out of his neighborhood as he 
no longer felt safe after living there without those worries for several years.
17. To be clear, the court in Madison did not offer these mediation sessions; I asked 
participants about mediation as a hypothetical alternative to financial restitution.
18. Jung Jin Choi, & Michael Gilbert, ‘Joe Everyday, People off the Street’: a Qualita-
tive Study on Mediators’ Roles and Skills in Victim-Offender Mediation, 13 Con-
temporary Just. Rev. 207 (2010); Mary Riley & Hennessey Hayes, Youth Re-
storative Justice Conferencing: Facilitators’ Language—Help or Hindrance?, 21 
Contemporary Just. Rev. 99 (2018); Christine Slater, et al., Youth Justice Coor-
dinators’ Perspectives on New Zealand’s Youth Justice Family Group Conference 
Process 15 J. of Soc. Work 621 (2015).
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these ongoing relationships or potential future run-ins and unanticipated 
repercussions of the incident (e.g., emotional and moving costs) still de-
mand our attention to understand more fully the impact of LFOs.
C. Potentially Different Timeframes and Scopes Between Paying 
Restitution and Repairing Harm to Victim
While the court in Madison granted restitution to all of the victims 
in my study who requested it, it did not necessarily give a time limit on 
how long it would take offenders to pay it.  In Madison, youths can work 
off part of the restitution by doing community service at a local nonprofit, 
which then sends the payments onto the victims; this process can lead to 
delays in getting those payments to the victims.19  Christine, the assault 
victim mentioned in the first part, got the check for partial restitution 
two years after the incident happened.  Frank, a thirty-five-year-old white 
man, had his bike stolen out of his apartment building’s locked park-
ing garage.  He has received a couple checks already for restitution but 
says, “If I get a $24 check every six to eight months . . . it’s gonna take a 
while . . . three to four years.”  Beyond the restitution for the bike, Frank 
also details the other effects that the incident has had on his life:
Things like that you don’t think about.  Um, and it’s just—it was—it 
was time taken to-to-to do . . . out of my, you know, my family life, 
to file a police report, you know, respond to them, file an insurance 
claim, multiple responses with them . . . I wanna say it was Jun-June 
or July, when it happened.  I didn’t get, uh, the official, um, return 
from my insurance until . . . I think September . . . I was able to—to 
go out and—and get it—purchase a bike  . . . so that I could start rid-
ing—riding to work again . . . so there was financial value, you know, 
to that time . . . as well because then I was having to drive into work.  
Uh, sometimes having to pay for parking, sometimes not . . .  And just, 
yeah, just overall . . . time spent, doing other things than—than what 
I—my normal routine was just . . . because of, you know, of . . . [the 
youth’s] Silly decision to—to go in and—and . . . take a bike.
While Frank might understand that these were just kids making a 
“silly decision,” the aftermath of that decision is far from silly.  Frank 
used to ride his bike to work in order to save on gas, parking costs, and car 
maintenance.  The three months that the insurance company took to pro-
cess his claim increased his commuting expenses.  In addition to the new 
financial expenses incurred beyond just replacing the bike, he talks about 
time he lost in dealing with the police and insurance company to fill out 
his insurance claim, taking away from his “family life” and “normal rou-
tine.”  Just as Sally mentioned the emotional impacts of the crime, Frank 
describes a cascading number of problems created by this one incident, 
which financial restitution does not always resolve.
19. The youths get $7.25 an hour minus Social Security tax (approximately $6.70/
hour).  So, if a youth owes $250, that would be 37 hours of community service 
at $6.70/hour.  If she has the maximum amount of restitution which is capped at 
$1000, that would be just over 149 hours.
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Similarly, Fred, a fifty-five-year-old white man, discussed the dam-
age to his rental property after youths fired a gun into the apartment 
of another youth due to a grievance between them; the bullets did not 
hit anyone but did hit the walls and bathtub.  The damage exceeded the 
maximum amount of restitution ($1000 per youth) assessed to youths 
in Madison.  However, due to the high deductible on his insurance, Fred 
did not fix completely the damage to the unit, as he insists the place was 
still “functional.”  That meant the victims were harmed even more by 
this incident by not having a fully operating bathroom.  In addition, Fred 
was worried about having the insurance premiums go up or, worse yet, 
being dropped as a client.  Both Frank and Fred’s experiences raise the 
following questions: How can restitution address the harm to the victim 
if the timing and amount of it do not match up with the repairs needed? 
If victims are part of the state’s rationale to assess LFOs to offenders, 
should the state be expected to “front” the money to the victims and have 
the offenders pay it back?20  If the answer is yes to that last question, it 
could open up the possibility for offenders to become more embedded in 
state surveillance and in further debt.
D. Questioning the Offender’s Sincerity in Performing Restorative 
Justice Options
While the court might impose a restorative justice option as an 
alternative to a LFO or other punishments, it might not feel that way 
to either the youth or victim if either senses an insincerity behind the 
youth’s actions in doing that option.  For example, one way to repair 
the harm caused to the victim is by writing a letter of apology.  Many 
victims in my study requested such a letter from the youth offender.  If 
they did get a letter, however, they also believed it felt coerced.  Frank 
said, “That’s something that could be . . . could be forced . . . you know, 
a translation from somebody else  .  .  .    Just going through the motions 
to get through the process on their end.”  Peter, a sixty-eight-year-old 
white man whose car was damaged by a youth who hit it while driving 
in a stolen car, felt dissatisfied with the letter of apology that the youth 
wrote to him, mainly because of the delay in receiving it.  He mentions 
that he had to ask the DA’s Victim Witness Office several times about it, 
which further aggravated his sense that the youth did not really want to 
write it.  He explains, “It was a handwritten letter . . . he actually wrote 
a good paragraph . . .  But truthfully, to me, it was sad that I had to force 
the issue . . .  Because at that point, more than six months later, it loses 
the sincerity of what you’re going through.  I felt that he had been com-
pelled.”  He felt more invested in this letter than any financial restitution, 
even though his car was totaled, because he realized the youth and his 
family probably could not pay for the repairs.  His goal in asking for the 
20. If the state did guarantee payment, Fred said he definitely would have fixed up 
the property completely.
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letter was to show he cared about the youth’s rehabilitation, in which he 
felt the letter played a key part.
On the other hand, some youth offenders had differing views of 
those letters, which were not related necessarily to being unwilling to 
admit responsibility for their wrongdoing.  Some said they would not do 
it if they did not commit the offense, felt wronged by the victim in some 
way, or did not see a benefit regarding their case.  Derrick, a sixteen-
year-old white youth arrested for smoking marijuana on school property, 
explained his view of it:
I see why they do it.  But it was hard to remember, like hey I gotta 
do that, when there’s so many other things like school, home-
work  .  .  .    You don’t really have time for it.  You know.  I mean 
the fact that I’m going to court and stuff really is already teaching 
me a lesson.
Derrick’s account indicates that a letter of apology is one task on a 
long list youth are supposed to do.  Moreover, it does not feel like it is 
a replacement of anything else but an additional responsibility on top 
of the court obligations, which he believes should be sufficient for him 
to learn “a lesson.”  This youth’s experience exemplifies a violation of 
Braithwaite’s constraining standard, further demonstrating the limited 
efficacy of restorative justice alternatives used in this context.
Conclusion
This essay has highlighted some of the inherent conflicts in empha-
sizing restitution as part of an offender’s sentence, using insights from 
restorative justice and the perspectives of youth offenders, families, and 
victims.  It also showed that financial restitution and monetizing alterna-
tives to restitution—as they are implemented in practice—should not be 
considered as the main means to “repair harm” and “teach responsibili-
ty.”  Victims do not often see financial restitution as the most important 
priority; most of them understood that the youths could not pay, so they 
wanted to make sure the youths focused on their rehabilitation or took 
on some responsibility.  The victims were also unsatisfied with alterna-
tives that emphasized responsibility such as letters of apologies because 
they felt the youths only did them to reduce the amount of their LFOs. 
For youths and their families, restitution was just a part of a frustrat-
ing and confusing experience with the justice system and other LFOs, in 
which restitution was added onto the traditional juvenile court responses, 
instead of replacing them.
In the broader discussion about LFO reform, the ideal option would 
be to abolish all of them.  However, abolishing restitution is a bit more 
complicated, as that does not help with enhancing offender accountabil-
ity or redressing harm to the victim, which could include both material 
and emotional after-effects from the crimes.  I am not arguing for the 
creation of new solutions per se, but for more of an empirically grounded 
and localized understanding of peoples’ experiences with restitution and 
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restorative justice to better see the conditions under which the options 
are realistic and meaningful.  Moving forward, it would help to remember 
the key components to successful restorative justice initiatives:
• clearly defined aims of each alternative;
• clear and ongoing communication among all parties about the 
process;
• well-trained facilitators for any potential meetings between vic-
tims and offenders; and
• inclusion of all voices (victims, youth offenders, and the commu-
nity) for determining the forms of restitution, including direct 
service to victims or community service options.
In closing, any attempt to include restitution as a means to instill a 
sense of accountability in the offender should heed the words of Rose, a 
twelve-year-old black youth arrested for a school fight:
It [community service] could, well yeah, and like [restorative justice] 
circles yeah, that’ll help you learn responsibility cuz that’s basically 
what they talk about .  .  .   But anything to do with money.  Like, if 
it’s teaching you how to deal with your money, then I guess that’s 
responsibility but if you tellin, yeah you have to pay it, that’s not re-
sponsibility . . .  No, that’s not nothin to do with responsibility.
As Rose describes, financial restitution, especially in the juvenile justice 
context, is not the way to achieve a satisfying resolution for either the 
youths or most victims.  Furthermore, monetizing punishment is effec-
tive if the youths have no meaningful way to earn the necessary amount 
to complete that court condition.  Instead, if restorative justice options 
such as community service could be separated from the financial com-
ponents of restitution, perhaps youths such as Rose would respond more 
effectively to the justice system’s decisions and attempts to teach them 
responsibility.
